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Carving the Brain at its Joints
A Commentary on Michael L. Anderson
Axel Kohler
When neuroscientists explain the biological basis of a phenomenon of interest,
they usually try to identify the parts of a system that seem do the relevant job,
and propose a model of how those parts interact to produce the phenomenon. This
mechanistic framework of explanation is widely used and has been investigated
from a philosophical point of view by different authors. In his target article, Mi-
chael Anderson poses a challenge to the currently dominant version of mechan-
istic explanation as advocated, e.g., by Carl Craver. Taking empirical results and
explanatory models from studies on retinal starburst amacrine cells as a starting
point, Anderson suggests that the current framework for mechanistic explanation
should be extended to include a differentiation between systems and mechanisms,
which would allow more leeway in understanding processing in the nervous sys-
tem. Mechanisms can then be seen to provide enabling constraints on the func-
tioning of systems, where the mechanisms do not need to be subsumed under the
system and do not even have to be on the same organizational level. Although
Anderson’s proposal is interesting and worth exploring, I am unconvinced that this
extension conforms to real-world explanatory practice and/or is necessary for ac-
commodating the understanding of direction-selectivity in the retina. I examine
another sample of research on starburst amacrine cells, where the integration of
empirical data and computational models shows that, on close inspection, it is dis-
tributed networks to which certain characteristics are ascribed—a situation that
can be handled with the available tools of mechanistic explanation.
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1 Introduction
One of the dominant frameworks of explanatory
practice in the neurosciences and the biological
sciences in general is the model of mechanistic
explanation  proposed  in  its  modern  form  by
Bechtel &  Richardson (1993) and recently ex-
tended by  Carl Craver (2007). Mechanistic ex-
planations describe entities and activities that
together bring about a phenomenon of interest
(Machamer et al. 2000). When we are interested
in how vision works, for example, we try to loc-
alize  the  relevant  parts  of  the  brain,  and
identify components and their types of interac-
tions in  order  to understand how we can see
things (Bechtel 2008). This model of mechan-
istic explanation is thought to capture the dom-
inant explanatory practice in the biological sci-
ences (Bechtel & Richardson 1993), but normat-
ive claims are also made with respect to the ad-
equacy of explanatory accounts.  Craver (2007)
proposes  a  number  of  constraints  on  con-
stitutive mechanistic explanation in order to de-
cide whether a mechanistic model is viable or
not.
In  his  target  article,  Michael Anderson
(this collection) takes current models of mech-
anistic explanation as a starting point for pro-
posing an important  extension of  the existing
accounts. In previous models, the system that
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exhibits a phenomenon and the mechanism that
explains  the  phenomenon  were  not  separated.
Sometimes parts of the system can be screened
off  with respect  to the phenomenon at  hand.
The windshields of a car and its radio compon-
ents are not really important in order to under-
stand how it drives, for example. It’s fine to say
that the whole car drives, but that only the rel-
evant components (engine, axles, tires) are do-
ing the mechanistic work. Focusing on the es-
sential components of a mechanism within a lar-
ger  system  is  unproblematic.  But  Anderson
worries about more complex cases in the neur-
osciences  where  the  system displaying  a  phe-
nomenon  does  not  encompass  the  relevant
mechanism  producing  the  phenomenon  and
might not even be on the same level of descrip-
tion as the mechanistic components.
Anderson wants to demonstrate that com-
ponential  constitution  is  not  sufficient  as  a
model of mechanistic explanation for the pro-
cessing of  directional  selectivity in  the retina.
Mechanisms computing direction of motion are
already  available  at  the  earliest  stages  of  the
visual hierarchy. The vital components of direc-
tion selectivity in the retina could be identified.
In  particular,  in  recent  discussion  starburst
amacrine  cells  (SAC)  have  been  viewed  as  a
mechanistic substrate of motion processing. The
SACs receive input from bipolar cells, which are
not  themselves  directionally  selective,  and
provide  output  to  direction-selective  ganglion
cells (Zhou & Lee 2008). The SACs themselves
seem to be the core component for retinal mo-
tion selectivity (Park et al. 2014; Yoshida et al.
2001).
Examining the current models of how dir-
ection selectivity is created in SACs, Anderson
takes note of a discrepancy between how direc-
tion selectivity is mechanistically achieved and
to which parts it is ascribed. He argues for a
distinction between the system S that Ψs (that
is, exhibits direction selectivity) and the mech-
anism M that accounts for S’s Ψ-ing. For the
case at hand, the SACs themselves or even just
single dendritic compartments of SACs Ψ, but a
much broader network of neighboring SACs and
bipolar cells needs to be considered in order to
provide a mechanistic account of SAC direction
selectivity.  Anderson  proposes  this  distinction
as  an  important  extension  of  Craver  and
Bechtel’s  model  of  mechanistic  explanation.
This  has  two  major  advantages,  according  to
Anderson: (1) there can be entities and actions
that play a role for M, but are not necessarily
parts of S. This allows a certain flexibility in de-
fining the system that displays Ψ, while at the
same time including all relevant components in
the mechanistic account of S’s Ψ-ing. (2) But if
there are parts of M that don’t need to be spa-
tially subsumed under S, neither do they need
to be at a lower level than S. So even the re-
quirement  of  componential  constitution  might
be relaxed to allow for higher-level mechanistic
components that play an important role in S’s
Ψ-ing.
As an alternative account of the relation-
ship between mechanisms M and the respective
systems S, Anderson proposes that M acts as an
enabling constraint on S:
[A]n enabling constraint is  a relationship
between entities and/or mechanisms at a
particular level of description and a func-
tional  system at the same or  a different
level,  such  that  the  entities/mechanisms
bias (i.e., change the relative probabilities
of) the outcomes of processing by the sys-
tem. (this collection, p. 12)
In the case of retinal direction selectivity, the
mechanistic  interaction  between  neighboring
SACs and BCs acts as an enabling constraint
for  the direction  selectivity  of  a  specific  SAC
dendritic compartment (i.e., the system).
The  most  straightforward  move  by  pro-
ponents  of  existing models  of  mechanistic  ex-
planation,  as  Anderson (this  collection)  also
notes, would be to claim that the differentiation
of system and mechanism is vacuous. Only the
mechanism as a whole can do the work. Even in
complex cases, one just has to pick out the right
subparts of the network (specific synapses, spe-
cific  compartments  of  neurons)  that  together
produce the phenomenon of interest. Anderson
provides  a  number  of  arguments  against  this
way of extending the concept of mechanism/sys-
tem, which I would like to briefly summarize:
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1. Neuroscientists just don’t talk about complex
directionally  selective  networks,  but  about
the direction selectivity of  certain dendritic
branches.
2. The mechanism as a whole does not display a
specific direction selectivity (it is not right-
ward-selective etc.), it only contributes to the
specific  selectivity  in  the  respective  SAC
dendrites. The mechanism contributes to dif-
ferent kinds of selectivities in different dend-
rites.
3. Making  fine-grained  distinctions  between
subparts (synapses, axon branches, dendrites
etc.) of the very same neurons that contrib-
ute to different directional selectivities is im-
plausible.
4. When the whole network is said to be direc-
tion-selective  (i.e.,  it  Ψs),  what  about  the
dendrite itself? Is it supposed to only signal
direction selectivity (signal Ψ-ing)? It is un-
likely that a clear distinction between Ψ-ing
and signaling Ψ-ing can be made.
The aim of this commentary is twofold. First, I
would like to argue that the described cases can
be handled by current models of mechanistic ex-
planation when one considers the options of re-
constituting the phenomena and top-down caus-
ation.  Second,  using  another  example  of  re-
search on SACs, I would like to show that the
straightforward ascription of direction selectiv-
ity to the SAC dendrites is at least debatable.
When looking at how empirical results are often
integrated with computational models of direc-
tion selectivity, it becomes clear that those phe-
nomena can only be understood by considering
the distributed nature of the involved networks.
2 Reconstituting the phenomena and top-
down causation
Anderson  proposes  a  separation  between  sys-
tems and mechanisms. No matter whether the
system is constrained to be a dendritic compart-
ment or whether it is extended to encompass all
mechanistically  relevant  parts,  there  are  tools
available  to  describe  the  respective  situation.
The  mechanistic  model  does  not  necessarily
consider systems in isolation from the environ-
ment or surrounding processes. Even if the sys-
tem is defined as the dendrite only, factors in-
fluencing dendritic processing as well as the em-
bedding of the system in the overall economy,
its organization, have to be considered in order
to arrive at an understanding of the system’s
functioning (Bechtel 2008, pp. 148–150). On the
other hand, I would like to argue that we have
good  reason  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  the
system to encompass all the contributing parts.
This is a situation in which the original ascrip-
tion of a function to a system part has to be re-
vised to accommodate new findings. This pro-
cess is termed reconstituting the phenomena by
Bechtel &  Richardson (1993).  Although direc-
tion selectivity was thought to be bound to or
even intrinsically generated in SAC dendrites, it
turns out that the system can only be under-
stood  in  combination  with  other  neural  ele-
ments that vitally contribute to the mechanism
in question.
One  advantage  that  Anderson  suggests
comes with the differentiation of system and
mechanism  is  that  mechanistic  components
can then be set at a different level of organiz-
ation  than  the  relevant  system.  The  SAC
dendrite  is  at a lower level  compared to the
input  from  bipolar  cells  and  the  network
structure (bipolar cells and neighboring SACs)
that  enables  SAC  direction-selectivity.  But
once  the  question  of  how exactly  we should
carve up the brain into systems and mechan-
isms  has  been  answered,  I  don’t  think  that
complex inter-level  relationships are much of
an  issue  for  mechanistic  accounts.  They  can
be easily accommodated within the framework
of top-down causation proposed by  Craver &
Bechtel (2007).  They suggest  that any refer-
ence  to  inter-level  interactions  can  be  ana-
lyzed in terms of within-level causal relation-
ships  between  parts  of  entities,  where  parts
and entities are related in a constitutive fash-
ion  and  entities  can  be  located  on  different
levels.  Emphasizing  the  fact  that  complex
inter-level  interactions often need to be con-
sidered in order to offer adequate explanatory
accounts in neuroscience is important, but it
is not outside the scope of current models of
mechanistic explanation.
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3 Systems and mechanisms for direction 
selectivity
Since the processing of direction selectivity in
the  retina  is  currently  a  very  active  research
field, there is substantial controversy concerning
the relevant entities and activities that contrib-
ute to the mechanism, as Anderson points out
in  his  target  article.  Some accounts  focus  on
local processes within the SAC dendrites them-
selves (Hausselt et al. 2007), while others draw
a broader picture of a multi-component process,
where the exact arrangement of cell types and
their  compartments  is  vital  for  direction  se-
lectivity (Lee &  Zhou 2006). For our purposes
here, I would like to use a most recent update
on SAC function offered by the group working
with Sebastian Seung. The group uses high-res-
olution electron-microscopy images of brain tis-
sue to reconstruct complete brain networks on a
cellular level. Apart from trained reconstruction
experts, the project also makes use of so-called
“citizen  neuroscientists”—volunteers  who  con-
tribute to the reconstruction process through an
online platform that employs gaming features to
guide  and  motivate  the  community  effort
(http://www.eyewire.org).
In their study, Seung and colleagues used
images from the mouse retina to analyze SAC
circuitry. They took a closer look at the exact
wiring  between bipolar  cells  (BCs)  and SACs
(Kim et al. 2014). BCs provide input to SACs,
but do not show any directional selectivity by
themselves. The main point of the article is to
show that different BC subtypes display differ-
ent patterns of connectivity with SACs. By ana-
lyzing  branch  depth  and  contact  area,  they
could show that one subtype (BC2) has mainly
connections  close  to  the  soma,  while  another
subtype (BC3a) has more connections far from
the soma in the outer  parts of  the dendrites.
Importantly, the BC subtypes, in turn, have dif-
ferent  intrinsic  visual  response  latencies.  BC2
seems to lag BC3a by 50ms and more. It can be
shown that the differential connectivity patterns
and the divergent latencies add up to produce
selectivity for a preferred direction of movement
going  out  from  the  soma  on  the  respective
dendrite in accordance with empirical results.
What is important about the paper is not
just the main result itself. Any empirical obser-
vation may be overruled in the (near) future. So
it is not particularly relevant whether these ex-
act cell types and this exact type of wiring is vi-
tal for the phenomenon at hand. What I found
intriguing in this study, however, was how the
relevant mechanism was described and how the
data  were  integrated  with  a  computational
model of direction selectivity, reflecting a recent
trend in the neurosciences to combine biological
and computational perspectives in explanatory
accounts. It shows how neuroscientists pick out
the relevant parts of a system that contribute to
a  specific  phenomenon  in  question.  The  pro-
posed computational model (Fig. 1a; Kim et al.
2014) maps the biological entities onto specific
parts of the computational circuit. The output
element at the lower part of the figure is the
SAC.  The  input  stems  from  BC2  (left)  and
BC3a (right); their respective response proper-
ties are captured as delay values and sustained
vs.  transient response types.  The circuit  com-
bines elements of  classical models of  direction
selectivity, the Reichardt (Fig. 1b) and the Bar-
low-Levick detectors (Fig.  1c). Clearly, the dir-
ection selectivity cannot  be attributed to any
one  of  the  system  components  in  isolation.
Mechanistic  accounts  and  the  corresponding
computational models both point to the whole
complex of entities as the relevant system that
achieves directional selectivity.
In  its  computational  abstraction,  the
model can be thought of as a canonical system
of  directional  selectivity.  Similar  models  have
also been applied to different hierarchical levels
of neural processing and different species.  For
example,  mechanisms  of  directional  selectivity
have  been  studied  for  a  long  time  in  the  fly
visual  system.  With very different  neural  ele-
ments and wiring,  a  system of  interconnected
neurons achieves directional selectivity with re-
sponse  properties  closely  resembling  the
Reichardt-type  of  motion  detector  (Borst &
Euler 2011). Again, only the combination of ele-
ments from different processing stages succeeds
in delivering direction selectivity as  a  system.
On  a  cortical  level,  direction  selectivity  has
been  first  described  for  complex  cells  of  the
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primary visual cortex (V1) in the seminal work
of  David Hubel &  Torsten Wiesel (1962).
Without offering a quantitative computational
model, they nevertheless suggest a hypothetical
connectivity pattern between different cell types
that might underlie the observed responses to
moving  patterns  in  complex  cells  (Hubel &
Wiesel 1962,  Fig.  20).  The model  shares  fea-
tures with other motion detectors;  a mapping
between components is possible.
When it comes to motion selectivity in the
brain, one of the most intensively studied cor-
tical areas is the middle temporal (MT) region.
The region was first described in the macaque
(Dubner & Zeki 1971; Zeki 1974) and owl mon-
keys (Allman & Kaas 1971). The human homo-
log, the human MT complex (hMT+; Tootell et
al. 1995;  Zeki et al. 1991), turned out to be a
collection of areas with related response proper-
ties (Amano et al. 2009;  Kolster et  al. 2010).
Again, to understand the direction selectivity of
MT, it is necessary to consider the cooperation
of cells in MT and the input processing stages,
mainly from V1. This cooperation and the need
for an integrated perspective is emphasized in
empirical studies (Saproo &  Serences 2014) as
well as computational models of MT function-
ing (Rust et al. 2006). Only the V1-MT system
as a whole is understood to deliver motion se-
lectivity as output of the MT stage.
But in terms of the role of MT in motion
processing, a case could be made in support of
Anderson’s suggested distinction between a sys-
tem that exhibits a certain selectivity and the
mechanism that  produces this  selectivity.  The
apparent locality and modularity of motion pro-
cessing in MT is based on very selective deficits
in patients with lesions in and around MT (Zeki
1991; Zihl et al. 1983). And stimulation of MT
with  transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  (TMS)
in healthy participants leads to selective deficits
in motion perception (Beckers & Hömberg 1992;
Beckers &  Zeki 1995;  Hotson et al. 1994;  Sack
et al. 2006). In a recent study, patients undergo-
ing brain surgery near MT could be investigated
with electrical stimulation (Becker et al. 2013).
Only  stimulation  of  MT  and  a  related  area
nearby, MST, led to an inability to perform a
simple motion-detection task, a rather specific
result concerning the relevance. Results of that
kind drive the intuition that the system that is
responsible for motion perception, independent
of any cortical areas that might mechanistically
contribute to the processing chain leading up to
MT (like V1), are localized in MT.
Lesion and other interference studies (e.g.,
with TMS) are  suggestive,  but  there  are also
well-known difficulties with interpreting the res-
ults.  Lesions mostly affect larger  parts of  the
brain and are rarely limited to a single cortical
site. As such it is often hard to identify the ac-
tual parts of the complex brain networks that
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Figure 1: Computational models of direction selectivity (a)
The selectivity of SACs described in Kim et al. (2014) can
be modeled with a computational framework using a com-
bination of sustained and transient response properties as
well as excitatory and inhibitory connections. The displayed
wiring would lead to direction selectivity for rightwards mo-
tion. The proposed model can be considered to combine pre-
vious classical models of direction selectivity, the Reichardt
detector (b) and the Barlow-Levick model (c). Green dots
indicate excitatory and red dots inhibitory synapses. ‘- ’ inτ -
dicates a temporal lead and ‘+ ’ a temporal lag. Reprintedτ
by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature (Kim
et al. 2014), copyright (2014).
www.open-mind.net
are affected. The advantage of stimulation tech-
niques is that the interference is temporary and
can be precisely targeted on a specific location.
But,  given  the  rich  connectivity  structure  of
neural networks, stimulation effects can be seen
even  in  remote  target  sites  (Bestmann et  al.
2004; Sack et al. 2007). In addition, TMS stud-
ies have shown that activity of MT might not
even be sufficient for conscious motion percep-
tion without the involvement of V1 (Pascual-Le-
one & Walsh 2001; Silvanto et al. 2005). There
are also further empirical as well as philosoph-
ical reasons for rejecting the claim that motion
perception can be attributed to MT in a strin-
gent fashion (Madary 2013), which I won’t dis-
cuss here.1
So  while  at  first  glance  MT  is  a  very
strong candidate  for  straightforward and very
local attribution of function, it seems again that
the relevant system is  more appropriately de-
scribed on a network level. The tendency to see
system parts  as vital  for a function may also
stem  from  the  limitations  of  our  employed
methods.  Lesion  cases  and  interference  tech-
niques  are  commonly interpreted  as  being in-
formative about the relevant gray-matter struc-
tures that are affected by the lesion or stimula-
tion.  But  there  is  evidence  that  interference
with white-matter connections between network
parts  can  be  even  more  incapacitating  than
gray-matter  damage.  It  has  long  been  known
that frontoparietal areas are implicated in a de-
ficit of visuospatial attention called neglect. But
very recently Thiebaut de Schotten et al. (2005,
2011) revealed that the properties of fiber con-
nections between frontal and parietal sites are
most predictive of visuospatial processing capa-
cities, and that their electrical stimulation leads
to  severe  deficits.  Transferring  this  insight  to
the case of MT, we simply have most direct ac-
cess to the cortical gray-matter centers involved
in motion processing, and since they are vital
components  of  the  system,  this  also  leads  to
1 Madary (2013) uses two sets of empirical results to show that repres-
entation of motion cannot be ascribed to MT simpliciter. One is the
recent emphasis on spontaneous activity making significant contribu-
tions to the state of sensory systems—they add content referring to
the attentional or sensorimotor state of the organism to input-de-
rived sensory representations. The other demonstrates that in MT
specifically, the response properties of cells can be quite variable and
are not consistently related to perceptual content only.
corresponding deficits when they are affected or
stimulated. But this might conceal the fact that
motion selectivity is a product of a wider net-
work that crucially depends on integrated pro-
cessing for proper functioning.
In  sum,  I  think that  close  inspection  of
how  direction  selectivity  is  investigated  and
treated in neuroscientific research is in disagree-
ment with Anderson’s  arguments (1) and (3).
Although it is true that investigators sometimes
refer loosely to local elements as displaying a
certain  characteristic,  the  corresponding  de-
tailed  and  extended  accounts  of  direction  se-
lectivity give credit to the distributed nature of
the relevant systems that figure in explanations.
Even considering the case of conscious motion
perception, it is unclear whether the presumed
locality of motion representation stands up to
stringent tests. Rather, it seems to be a case of
localized interference with a distributed system
where  damage  to  vital  hubs  leads  to  funda-
mental deficits.
4 Conclusion
In this commentary, I have defended the claim
that the current tools of mechanistic explana-
tion  are  sufficient  for  accommodating  the  ex-
planatory goals in current neuroscience, particu-
larly in the special case of direction selectivity
in the retina and other neural systems. A closer
look at explanatory practice shows that, in rep-
resentative cases of empirical research, models
of direction selectivity have to take a number of
components  in  a  distributed  network into  ac-
count in order to provide a full-fledged descrip-
tion of the relevant processes. On the philosoph-
ical side, the conceptual tools of “reconstituting
the phenomena” (Bechtel &  Richardson 1993)
and  “top-down  causation”  (Craver &  Bechtel
2007), offered by existing models of mechanistic
explanation,  might  be  sufficient  for  capturing
the problematic cases to which  Anderson (this
collection) points.
On the  other  hand,  Anderson’s  proposal
(this  collection)  to  extend  existing  models  of
mechanistic explanation with the notion of en-
abling constraints is very interesting and might
offer  an  avenue  to  more  nuanced  mechanistic
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descriptions of systems in their contextual em-
bedding. In almost all relevant cases in neuros-
cience  research,  there  are  various  external
factors  influencing  the  workings  of  a  system,
and it is often difficult to draw clear boundaries
between  vital  and  non-vital,  but  nevertheless
highly  influential  system  components.  Ander-
son’s  framework would offer  a  viable  solution
for  handling  those  modulatory  constraints.
Resolving  this  debate  will  also  depend  on  a
clear conception of how the entities that display
a certain phenomenon are  best  identified  and
described.
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